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Abstract 
This paper considers a metropolitan area where residents can commute 
between several jurisdictions. These residents show NIMBY behavior (Not-
In-My-Backyard). They try to preserve their living quality by pushing their 
polluting economic activity to the neighboring jurisdictions, while keeping 
their labor income as commuters. This induces a race-to-the-top among 
jurisdictions. Fiercer competition due to a higher number of jurisdictions 
intensifies this race-to-the-top; commuting costs, pollution taxes, payroll 
taxes and bigger jurisdictions increase rather than decrease the incentive for 
more pollution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We present a theoretical model that can be used to study the environmental policy of small 
jurisdictions. We highlight the application of the model to the occurrence of NIMBY’s (not-in-my-
backyard behavior) in (sub-) metropolitan jurisdictions. NIMBY behavior is often observed in 
projects involving local pollution1,2, such as the location of waste incinerators, landfills, big 
industrial plants or airports, etc. We show that NIMBY behavior and a race-to-the-top among 
jurisdictions may originate from inter-jurisdictional commuting. Jurisdictions may set excessively 
stringent environmental regulations in a common labor market. As the residents of a jurisdiction 
can commute at a low cost, they do not fully depend on local economic activity for their income. 
They will try to preserve the environmental quality in their home jurisdiction by pushing polluting 
economic activity to neighboring jurisdictions, and keep their labor income as commuters. 
Moreover, this behavior is exacerbated when the rents generated by local pollution do not fully 
accrue to the residents, but leak (partially) to other jurisdictions. Jurisdictions may thus face a 
prisoners’ dilemma, in which they all push for a level of local environmental quality that is too 
high (race-to-the-top). Further we show that local payroll taxes (i.e. source-based wage taxes), 
pollution taxes, positive commuting costs or bigger jurisdictions may increase the pollution level. 
This paper’s race-to-the-top conclusion is in strong contrast to the “business tax models”3 where 
jurisdictions competing for capital in a world economy tend to allow for too much pollution if only 
a source-based capital tax is available (race-to-the-bottom). Jurisdictions fear that 
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to jurisdictions with lower 
standards. If each jurisdiction reasons the same way, all will adopt lower standards of 
environmental quality than they would prefer if they could cooperate in setting higher standards. 
The desire to coordinate policies motivates the centralized control in the US and EU over 
environmental policy. 
Oates and Schwab (1988) presented the first theoretical objection to the race-to-the-bottom. 
They show that decentralized regulation may be efficient when the distorting capital taxes are 
                                                    
1 Frey et al. (1996) define NIMBY projects as all undertakings that increase overall welfare (public good) but impose net 
costs on the individuals living in the host community (private bad).  
2 Local pollution includes e.g. noise, smell, local air pollution as root and dust, decrease of scenic value, etc. 
3 Among others, Oates and Schwab (1988), and more generally for local public goods, Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986) 
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set to zero and a residence-based lump-sum tax can be used. This result, however, hinges on 
the assumption that all pollution rents are distributed back to the residents of the jurisdiction. 
This rent distribution assumption parallels a perfect Pigouvian emissions tax and interferes with 
the command-and-control policy (Levinson, 1997). Second, Wellisch (1995) observes that 
pollution rents are in general not confined to jurisdictions, since they are also captured by firms 
owned by non-residents. The residents bear the entire burden of the pollution and gain few 
benefits. He concludes that decentralized command-and-control regulation leads to 
environmental overprotection. Kunce and Shogren (2005a) also allow for non-resident 
ownership of polluting firms. They state, however, that local governments, facing fiscal 
constraints (and where no Pigouvian or first-best fiscal instruments are available), adopt capital 
tax structures that exacerbate inefficiencies of decentralized command-and-control, reducing 
the overprotection and possibly even leading to a race-to-the-bottom. In a third objection, Glazer 
(1999) presumes that the benefits gained from firms locating to a jurisdiction are sufficiently 
small and are overwhelmed by the additional environmental costs. His model for two identical 
jurisdictions shows that each jurisdiction tries to shift the environmental damage to the other 
jurisdiction. This happens even when residents of a single jurisdiction own all the firms in that 
jurisdiction. 
Empirical evidence for a race-to-the-bottom is weak at best, and some studies rather suggest a 
race-to-the-top. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find evidence of strategic environmental policy 
across U.S. states but are unable to conclude if the evidence supports a race-to-the-top or race-
to-the-bottom. Fredriksson and Gaston (1999), examine the votes on environmental legislation 
in the U.S. in state legislatures as well as at the congressional level. They find no tendency for 
state politicians to vote against environmental measures. List and Gerking (2000) and Millimet 
(2003) analyze the decentralization of environmental policy under Reagan. List and Gerking 
(2000) conclude that a race-to-the-bottom in environmental quality did not materialize in the 
1980’s. Moreover, Millimet (2003) finds strong evidence that decentralized environmental policy 
contributed to a race-to-the-top in abatement expenditures. Fredriksson et al. (2004), however, 
point out that the previous literature considers strategic interaction in a uni-dimensional 
framework. Jurisdictions may respond to a more lenient environmental policy from their 
neighbors not only by lowering their environmental standards, but also by lowering state-level 
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taxation or increasing infrastructure spending. Their result suggests that important own- and 
cross-policy interactions exist. They conclude that the literature covering uni-dimensional 
frameworks presents lower bound estimates of the degree of strategic interaction. 
The previous theoretical papers focus on firm and capital mobility in the tradition of the 
business-tax models. NIMBY behavior and environmental quality in residential areas and 
commuting belts, however, have received less attention. Fischel (2001a, 2001b) argues that 
greater decentralization may lead to a NIMBY reaction by homeowners. A home is the largest 
asset most people own and owners cannot insure against devaluation by neighborhood effects.  
Because their assets would be devalued by pollution, local governments are cautious in 
admitting new industries and developments. Frey et al. (1996) analyze why compensation 
schemes dealing with NIMBY behavior frequently fail. They state that traditional economic 
theory of compensation is incomplete because it neglects the influence of moral principles. In 
political decision making, such moral considerations weaken the effects of price incentives. 
Levinson (1999) studies state taxes on hazardous waste disposal. Hazardous waste disposal 
confers few benefits on local jurisdictions and has high perceived costs. States have an 
incentive to set waste tax levels too high. Further, Levinson shows empirically that state 
hazardous waste taxes matter. He concludes that devolved environmental policy is inefficient. 
Fredriksson (2000) develops a political economy model for the siting of hazardous waste 
disposal facilities in a federal system with many small jurisdictions. He concludes that the lower 
government levels in federations should get the authority over siting decisions. The centralized 
government faces a greater obstacle in the compensation effort, as each jurisdiction has an 
incentive to favor capacity in the other jurisdictions. Feinerman et al. (2004) develop a model 
where the government of a two-city economy determines the location of a noxious facility. The 
government is subject to political pressures by city-level lobbies of landowners. In the empirical 
section, they asses the prospects of the political system for resolving the NIMBY conflict over 
locating a landfill-site in a multiple-city region in Israel. Cavailhès et al. (2004) study the 
periurban belt around poles of economic activity. They explain that households value rural 
amenities and hence, may live close to farmers. These households commute to their jobs.  
Our paper explains how the very nature of commuting may induce a race-to-the-top/ NIMBY 
behavior between small jurisdictions. So far, most NIMBY studies have focused on hazardous 
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waste, landfills and other noxious installations. We believe that our paper is applicable to a 
wider range of local environmental problems. Methodologically, the model builds on the model 
of Braid (1996). In his analysis of tax competition in metropolitan areas, commuting takes the 
form of factor movement, i.e. jurisdictions compete for labor force. This approach differs from 
most commuting papers which focus on congestion or firm-worker matching on the labor 
market4. 
Our model has three main features. First, the model has three levels. We discuss a metropolitan 
area in a world economy, and this metropolitan area has a number of jurisdictions5. These 
jurisdictions have Nash interactions, using local environmental quality as strategic variable. The 
metropolitan government is merely a referee, guaranteeing the legal order. Second, output is 
produced using labor and pollution. Jurisdictions produce a single good, which is sold on the 
world market for a normalized price of 1. We assume that pollution is local and does not cross 
the jurisdictional borders6. Third, the most important feature of the model is that Nash 
interactions occur in the common labor market. Residential locations are fixed7, but the 
consumers who live in one jurisdiction can commute to work in any of the other jurisdictions. 
Thus each jurisdiction is able to influence the wage of the common labor market.  
Section 2 develops a symmetric model. Section 3 gives the socially optimal outcome. In section 
4 we find that the model without taxes leads to a race-to-the-top. Section 5 discusses the effect 
of lump-sum, payroll and pollution taxes on the environmental policy of jurisdictions. In section 6 
we look at positive commuting costs and non-identical jurisdictions. We conclude in section 7. 
2.  MODEL 
We consider a metropolitan area in a world economy with n identical jurisdictions (indexed by i). 
In each jurisdiction we find a single industry, comprised of fixed number of identical polluting 
firms8. Industry output is produced using mobile labor (Ni) and local pollution (Pi). Ni is the 
                                                    
4 Papers analyzing congestion or labor market in presence of commuting include, among others, Anas and Xu (1999), 
Zenou (2000), De Borger and Van Dender (2003), Borck and Wrede (2005) and de Palma and Proost (forthcoming). 
5 Jurisdictions are defined as counties, municipalities and districts in metropolitan areas. 
6 For more on transboundary pollution see, e.g.  Baumol and Oates (1988) or Silva and Caplan (1997) 
7 This assumption is realistic in cases where transaction costs of moving are high due to the tax structure on the 
housing market, most European countries being examples. 
8 The number of firms in the jurisdictions is fixed and large. Kunce and Shogren (2005b) point out that a fixed number of 
firms correspond to a long-run equilibrium.  
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endogenous number of workers in jurisdiction i, each supplying one unit of labor; whereas N0 
represents the fixed number of residents in each jurisdiction. The residents cannot migrate to 
other jurisdictions. We treat pollution in a jurisdiction (Pi) as an input to local production. The 
pollution externalities only hurt the residents in the jurisdiction where they are created. Contrary 
to most of the inter-jurisdictional competition literature, this model concentrates on location 
choices of labor rather than on firm, capital or population mobility. 
The total production of the identical firms in jurisdiction i is determined by the constant-returns-
to-scale neo-classical production function F(Ni, Pi), which is homogeneous of degree one. We 
assume that FN, FP and FNP are positive9, and that FNN and FPP are negative. This guarantees 
that a perfect competition solution exists.  
3. SOCIAL OPTIMUM 
Social optimum requires the maximization of the residents’ utility in jurisdiction 1 (1)10. We 
assume that (1) is a strictly quasi-concave function, decreasing in aggregate emissions (UP<0), 
and increasing in per-capita consumption per capita (UC>0). This maximization problem is 
subject to 3 constraints. First, the utility of all other jurisdictions remains constant11. Second, the 
aggregate consumption equals the aggregate production (3). Third, total labor demand equals 
total available labor (4). The social optimum becomes12 
 
1 1 1
1
1 1, ,
max ( , )
N C P
U C P  (1) 
Subject to 
22
2 2( , )U C P U=  (2) 
 [ ]1 1 2 2 0 1 2( , ) ( 1) ( , ) ( 1)F N P n F N P N C n C+ − = + −  (3) 
 1 2 0( 1)N n N nN+ − =  (4) 
                                                    
9 A positive FNP means that labor and pollution are complements. This is realistic with strongly aggregated inputs as in 
this model. For more properties of the production function F(N,P), see Appendix A. 
10 The representative jurisdiction is denoted as jurisdiction 1; the other jurisdictions are represented by jurisdiction 2. 
11 Wellisch (1995) and Kunce and Shogren (2005a,b) use a similar approach for the social optimum. We implicitly 
assume perfect redistribution possibilities across jurisdictions. Under this condition, it is sufficient to maximize utility 
of jurisdiction 1 keeping the utilities of the other jurisdictions constant. 
12 Saveyn (2006) shows all derivations of this paper in detail.  
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We ignore the corner solutions (i.e. N1>0 and N2>0) and the following optimal conditions 
characterize a social optimum. 
 0     i=1,2
i
iP
Pi
C
UN F
U
− = ∀  (5) 
 1 2N NF F=  (6) 
Equation (5) says that the each jurisdiction chooses the consumption and pollution level such 
that the marginal rate of substitution between the two, summed over all jurisdictional residents 
equals the marginal product of environment (FP). This corresponds to the Samuelson Rule for 
optimal pollution, where the left-hand side of the equation equals the marginal willingness to pay 
for the environment. If it did not hold in some jurisdiction, then it would be possible to change 
the pollution level in that jurisdiction so as to increase welfare. Equation (6) shows that the 
marginal product of labor is equal across jurisdictions. If this did not hold, it would be possible to 
increase welfare by commuters moving from a jurisdiction where the marginal product of labor is 
low to a jurisdiction where it is high.  
4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TAXES 
We are interested in a symmetric Nash equilibrium13 with the local pollution level as the strategic 
variable. Following the command-and-control strategy of Oates and Schwab (1988) and Kunce 
and Shogren (2005a,b), each jurisdiction sets the aggregate local pollution level, Pi. In order to 
derive the equilibrium, it is sufficient to consider the environmental policy of a representative 
jurisdiction, denoted as jurisdiction 1, subject to the exogenous environmental policy of the other 
n-1 identical jurisdictions, denoted as jurisdiction 2. The location choice of labor in the 
jurisdictions is endogenous. 
Jurisdiction 1 chooses P1 to maximize the utility of a representative resident (7) subject to its 
budget constraint (8) and taking P2 as given. The consumption of all residents in jurisdiction 1 
                                                    
13 The Nash equilibrium is the standard equilibrium concept in fiscal competition. Its existence and uniqueness is 
among the most persisting problems in fiscal federalism. Most authors merely assume the existence of the equilibrium. 
The few authors dealing with the existence problem have encountered very demanding assumptions (e.g. Bucovetsky, 
1991; Laussel and Le Breton, 1998). Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005), however, relax the demanding assumptions of 
the Nash equilibrium, using the concept of 2nd-order locally consistent equilibrium (2-LCE) for the Zodrow and 
Mieskowski fiscal competition model. The 2-LCE concept ensures that a set of local maxima is reached in equilibrium. 
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consists of the wage (w) and their share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area (Ri). We 
assume that the residents of all jurisdictions own an equal share of all firms. Hence, the 
pollution rents generated in the metropolitan area are distributed equally across all residents of 
all jurisdictions. In this stage we have not yet incorporated the local non-environmental public 
goods provided by the local government. We introduce them in section 5. 
 
1
1 1max ( , )P U C P  (7) 
Such that 1 20 1 0
( 1)R n RN C N w
n
+ −= +  (8) 
The basic equilibrium conditions determine w, Ni and Ri as function of Pi14 
  1 2 0( 1)N n N nN+ − =  (4) 
 ( , )N i iw F N P=  (9) 
 ( , ) 0i P i i iR F N P P= ≥?  (10) 
The total number of residents in each jurisdiction is fixed (4). Workers can commute between 
jurisdictions at zero cost15. This assures that the same endogenous net wage rate, w, prevails 
across all jurisdictions (9). The firms use environmental resources for production at zero cost 
and, hence, pollution generates pollution rents16, Ri (10). As labor can commute freely the 
equilibrium need to observe (4) and (9). The comparative-static derivative of labor in a 
jurisdiction (9) w.r.t. local pollution level and evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium gives the 
following result  
LEMMA 1: In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe), the equilibrium quantity of labor in a 
jurisdiction is related to the local pollution level as follows 
 1
1
1 NP
NN
FN n
P n F
∂ −= −∂  (11) 
                                                                                                                                                        
No jurisdiction faces an incentive to deviate unilaterally from its equilibrium strategy by some small readjustment of its 
strategy variable. Whether these relaxed assumptions also apply for this model is a topic for future research. 
14 The non-index subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
15 For the sake of simplicity, we assume costless commuting. We relax this in section 6. 
16 From the linear homogeneity of production 
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Equation (11) states that an increase of the local pollution level attracts more labor to 
jurisdiction 1. Obviously, eq. (11) becomes zero for a unique jurisdiction (n=1). For an infinitely 
high number of jurisdictions (n→+∞), it converges to -FNP/FNN, the marginal rate of substitution 
of pollution for labor.  
We illustrate the inefficiencies arising with decentralized decision-making. In a symmetric 
equilibrium all endogenous variables are identical for all n jurisdictions17. The symmetric Nash-
equilibrium values of the pollution levels for jurisdictions are 
PROPOSITION 1: In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe),  a jurisdiction, chooses a pollution 
level, Pe, such that 
 0
P P
C
U FN
U n
− =  (12) 
Equation (12) shows that the decentralized environmental policy differs from the social 
environmental efficiency (5). In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, every jurisdiction reduces 
marginal environmental damage  to a level that is too low. It considers only 1/n of the marginal 
product of pollution, instead of the full marginal product. The full benefits of pollution do not 
accrue to the residents due to two leakages. First, because firms are not fully locally owned, 
pollution rents leak to the other jurisdictions. Second, and more interestingly, wages leak to 
other jurisdictions too due to commuting. Stated differently, jurisdictions are not fully dependent 
on the economic activity within their borders. The residents of jurisdictions benefit little from 
local pollution, but they carry the full burden of the local pollution. The jurisdictions have 
incentives to set excessively restrictive pollution standards. 
Number of jurisdictions 
The degree of competition among jurisdictions depends on the number of jurisdictions, n, in the 
metropolitan area. A higher number of jurisdictions induce more competition. In order to make 
our point clear, we look at two extreme cases, a single-jurisdiction metropolitan area (n=1) and 
a metropolitan area with an infinite high number of jurisdictions (n→+∞). 
                                                    
17 In the symmetric equilibrium (Ne, Pe ) we find that N0=N1=N2=Ne, R1=R2=Re and P1=P2=Pe 
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COROLLARY 1: A single-jurisdiction metropolitan area, chooses an optimal pollution level, Pe, 
such that,  
 0
P
P
C
UN F
U
− =  (13) 
And, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe), a jurisdiction in a metropolitan area with an infinite 
number of jurisdictions, chooses a pollution level Pe, such that 
 0 0P
C
UN
U
− →  (14) 
In a single-jurisdiction metropolitan area there is no commuting and the firms are fully locally 
owned. Hence, there are no leakages and the local government chooses the socially efficient 
level of pollution (13). With an infinite number of jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction is a price-taker 
on the common labor market. It does not have any market power and its environmental policy 
does not influence the common net wage. Moreover, the pollution rents are dissipated across all 
jurisdictions. Hence, the leakages reduce the benefits of local pollution to zero, whereas the 
residents of the jurisdiction still carry the full burden of local pollution. The local government 
behaves like an extreme NIMBY and it sets the pollution level at zero (14). 
5. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH TAXES 
We discuss the effect of taxes on the environmental policy of jurisdictions. We look, 
successively, at three types of taxes, a resident-based income tax (ai), a source-based pay-roll 
tax (bi) and a pollution tax (ti). We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the tax revenues are 
distributed in a lump-sum way to the jurisdiction’s residents. Implicitly, this presumes that non-
environmental public goods are provided efficiently (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution 
between public and private consumption is 1). In the symmetric equilibrium, the tax rates are 
equal across the jurisdictions, a1=a2=a0, b1=b2=b0, t1=t2=t0. 
Income Tax 
The residence-based income tax, ai, is equivalent to a lump-sum tax since residents do not 
migrate and labor-leisure choice is ignored in this paper. There is no way to avoid this labor 
income tax.  This tax does not change the basic equilibrium conditions (4), (9) and (10), and the 
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total income of all residents in jurisdiction 1 is identical to eq. (8). The analysis gives the same 
results as for the symmetric model without taxes (12). Again, a single-jurisdiction metropolitan 
area provides the socially efficient level of pollution (13), whereas with an infinite number of 
jurisdictions there is no pollution admitted (14). 
Pay-roll Tax 
The source-based pay-roll tax, bi, is distorting as the pay-roll tax can be avoided through 
commuting. Basic equilibrium condition (9), determining the wage level, changes into  
 (1 ) ( , )i N i iw b F N P= −  (15) 
Now, the consumption of all residents in jurisdiction 1 consists of the net wage of these 
residents, their share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area and the local payroll tax 
revenues. 
 1 20 1 0 1 1
( 1)
N
R n RN C N w b F N
n
+ −= + +  (16) 
Jurisdiction 1 chooses P1 and b1 to maximize the utility of a representative resident (7) subject to 
its budget constraint (16) and taking P2 and b2 as given. The first-order conditions for the 
jurisdiction’s problem are 
 0 1
n-1 -
n
N NPP P
C NN
F FU FN b
U n F
− =  (17) 
 1 0
NN
N
Fb N
F
= −  (18) 
Combining (17) and (18), results in 
PROPOSITION 2: In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe),  a jurisdiction, using a payroll tax, 
chooses a pollution level, Pe, such that 
 0 0
n-1
n
P P
NP
C
U FN F N
U n
− = +  (19) 
Equation (19) shows that the payroll tax reduces the race-to-the-top. Moreover, with N0FNP >FP, 
the pollution level is higher than the social efficiency. The payroll tax alleviates the leakage of 
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wage income through commuting, as all workers (incl. commuters) contribute to the budget of 
the jurisdiction where the firm is located. The leakage of pollution rents, however, persists. The 
payroll tax gives an incentive to increase the pollution level. The local government sets less 
restrictive pollution standards than with a lump-sum tax, but this may still be lower than the 
optimal level.  
COROLLARY 2: A single-jurisdiction metropolitan area, using a pay-roll tax, chooses pollution 
levels, Pe, such that,  
 0
P
P
C
UN F
U
− =  (20) 
And, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe), a jurisdiction in a metropolitan area with an infinite 
number of jurisdictions, using a payroll tax,  chooses pollution level Pe, such that 
 0 0
P
NP
C
UN F N
U
− →  (21) 
A single-jurisdiction metropolitan area provides the socially efficient level of pollution (20). With 
an infinite number of jurisdictions, the government sets the pollution level higher than zero (21). 
Pollution Tax 
The pollution tax is an alternative instrument to the pollution standard. The local governments 
specify a tax that firms pay for pollution. The first best optimal tax for pollution becomes 
 P iF t=  (22) 
Firms consider the pollution tax, ti, as a parameter and pollute to the point where the marginal 
product of pollution equals the pollution tax. The basic equilibrium condition (10), determining 
the rent, changes into 
 i P i i iR F P t P= −  (23) 
The local government returns the pollution tax revenues to its residents in a lump-sum way. The 
income constraint for the residents becomes 
 1 20 1 0 1 1
( 1)R n RN C N w t P
n
+ −= + +  (24) 
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This income consists of the net wage of these residents, the pollution tax revenues and their 
share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area. These pollution rents, however, are zero as 
every jurisdiction taxes them away. Jurisdiction 1 chooses t1 to maximize the utility of a 
representative resident (7) subject to its budget constraint (24). The pollution level, Pi, is not 
exogenously set; it is determined indirectly through the jurisdiction’s choice of ti. The symmetric 
values of the pollution levels for jurisdictions are  
PROPOSITION 3: In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe),  a jurisdiction, using a pollution tax, 
chooses a pollution level, Pe, such that 
 0
P
P
C
UN F
U
− =  (25) 
We see that when all jurisdictions of the metropolitan area use a pollution tax to regulate the 
pollution level, these jurisdictions provide the socially optimal level of environmental quality. If 
the pollution tax revenues are distributed among the jurisdictional residents, the rent from local 
pollution is internalized. The jurisdictions have incentives to increase the pollution level. As all 
jurisdictions increase the pollution level, this has a positive effect on the common labor market 
wage. The combined effect leads to the socially efficient pollution level.  We conclude that the 
pollution tax, ti, is a Pigouvian instrument to realign the overprotection result of devolved 
environmental policy. This result is similar to the outcomes of Wellisch (1995) and Kunce and 
Shogren (2005a). In these papers the pollution tax only corrects for one leakage, namely, the 
non-resident ownership of mobile firms. In this paper, however, the pollution tax corrects two 
leakages, namely, the foreign-ownership of the firms and the leakage through commuting. 
6. COMMUTING COSTS AND ASYMMETRIC JURISDICTIONS 
We introduce a fixed positive commuting cost (c≥0) and asymmetric jurisdictions, respectively. 
Non-zero commuting cost 
With a non-zero commuting cost, the commuters lose a part of the wage they earn in other 
jurisdictions. Hence, they prefer to look for a job in their own jurisdiction in the first place. 
Equations (26) and (27) describe the relations between the wages in the jurisdictions. The 
commuting cost spans the gap between the wages in jurisdictions. These relations hold only as 
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long as all wages are positive (w2=w1-c≥0 or w1=w2-c≥0). If c is high (w1-c<0 or w2-c<0), there is 
no longer commuting and eq. (26) and (27) do not longer hold. The wages are independent 
from the other jurisdictions. 
 1 2 0w w c= − ≥   if N1< N0< N2 (26) 
 2 1 0w w c= − ≥   if N2<N0< N1 (27) 
If w2-c≥0, the consumption of all residents in jurisdiction 1 consists of the wage of the residents 
working in jurisdiction 1, the wage of the residents working in jurisdiction 2 (if any) and their 
share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area. 
 ( )( ) 1 20 1 1 1 0 1 2 ( 1)R n RN C N w N N w c n
+ −= + − − +  (28) 
If w2-c<0, the commuting cost is too high and the residents in jurisdiction 1 do not commute. 
Consumption in jurisdiction 1 consists of the wage of the residents working in jurisdiction 1 and 
their share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area. 
 1 20 1 0 1
( 1)R n RN C N w
n
+ −= +  (29) 
Jurisdiction 1 chooses P1 to maximize the utility of a representative resident (7) subject to its 
budget constraint (28) or (29) and taking P2 as given. The symmetric Nash-equilibrium values of 
the pollution levels are 
PROPOSITION 4: In a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Ne,Pe) and with a positive commuting cost 
(c≥0),  a jurisdiction, chooses a pollution level, Pe, such that 
If w1=w2-c≥0, 
 0
1 NPP P
C NN
FU F nN c
U n n F
−− = −  (30) 
Or if w1=w2-c<0, 
 0 0
1P P
NP
C
U F nN N F
U n n
−− = +  (31) 
Equation (30) equals (31), if 
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  0 NNc N F= −  (32) 
Equations (30) and (31) are generalizations of the conventional result (12). Setting the 
commuting cost to zero (c=0) in (30) results in FP/n. With n=1, we find the social optimum, the 
conventional result for a single-jurisdiction metropolitan area (13). Without commuting (31), 
there is only one leakage left, the redistribution of the pollution rents. Indeed, very high 
commuting costs give the same pollution levels as the equilibrium with a payroll tax (19). The 
policy implication is that low commuting costs (e.g. through subsidies) enhance NIMBY behavior 
and may lead to inefficiently low levels of pollution. 
Asymmetric model 
In the real world, urban areas typically consist of a central city surrounded by small suburbs. In 
many metropolitan areas in the US, the central city has about 25-30% of the metropolitan 
population (Braid, 2005). We construct an asymmetric model with jurisdiction 1 of size β=m and 
(n-m) jurisdictions 2 of size β=1. Basic equilibrium condition (4) changes into 
 1 2 0( )mN n m N nN+ − =  (33) 
The consumption of the residents in jurisdiction i (34) consists of the wage of the residents and 
their share in the pollution rents of the metropolitan area. 
 1 20 0
( )
i i
R n m RN C N w
n
β β β + −= +  (34) 
Jurisdiction i chooses Pi to maximize the utility of a representative resident (7) subject to its 
budget constraint (34) and taking the pollution of the other jurisdictions as given. The Nash-
equilibrium value of the pollution level for jurisdiction i is  
PROPOSITION 5: In an asymmetric Nash equilibrium (Ni,Pi), jurisdiction i of size β chooses a 
pollution level, Pi, such that 
 0
i
iP
Pi
C
UN F
U n
ββ− =  (35) 
Equation (35) is a generalization from the result for a symmetric model (12). Both small and big 
jurisdictions set their pollution level, respecting eq. (35). If jurisdiction i is of size β =1, then we 
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get a result identical to the symmetric model (12). Bigger jurisdictions (β >1) allow for more 
pollution. With size β =n, we get the socially optimal level of pollution, FP. In Saveyn (2006) we 
show that for models with two different sizes of jurisdictions, the Nash equilibrium is 
independent from the size of the other jurisdictions in the metropolitan area.  
The asymmetric model responds better to the reality of a metropolitan area. Here, we often 
observe a big core with a commuting belt or dormitory towns around it. Most economic activity 
happens in the core, whereas the dormitory towns care more about their living quality. Our 
result also suggests that we may solve NIMBY problems by bringing the jurisdictions under a 
common metropolitan government. This solution is an alternative to the use of taxes.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper helps to explain why NIMBY behavior is observed in the “green”  dormitory towns or 
commuter belt with a high proportion of active participants in the economy. Our paper considers 
inter-jurisdictional competition where the jurisdictions interact through a common labor market. 
The main results differ in character from those of the traditional “business-tax competition 
models”. The inter-jurisdictional competition on the labor market leads to a race-to-the-top, as 
commuters prefer to work in the other jurisdictions, while preserving a high environmental 
quality in their home jurisdiction. Fiercer competition due to an increasing number of 
jurisdictions intensifies this race-to-the-top. 
It is useful to discuss the policy implications of our results. First, we show that jurisdictions can 
(imperfectly) correct the race-to-the-top using payroll taxes and pollution taxes. The payroll tax 
corrects the wage leakage through commuting. The loss of pollution rents, however, persists. 
Although, the use of payroll taxes leads to higher pollution levels, the optimal level is not 
guaranteed. The pollution tax, however, is a Pigouvian instrument, leading to the socially 
efficient pollution levels. In most countries, the higher-governments limit the policy instruments 
that local governments can use, thereby possibly reducing the scope for alleviating NIMBY 
behavior through taxes. In e.g. Japan, Germany, Sweden and Denmark, income taxes make up 
most of the local tax revenue. In the US, however, only 16 out of the 50 states allow local 
governments to use wage or income taxes. Payroll taxes are merely used in 5 states. In the 
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Anglo-Saxon world property taxes are by far the most important source of local tax revenue18 
(Braid, 2005). In other countries, the local tax revenues are more balanced between different 
taxes. In Belgium, municipalities levy, on average, around 20 different taxes. Taxes account for 
about 47% of the local budget; the remainder being (mainly) covered by dividends from gas and 
electricity utilities (9%) and transfers from higher government levels (40%). The residence-
based income taxes and property taxes make up about 20% of the total municipal budget each. 
Taxes on firm profits or environmental taxes are relatively insignificant at the lowest government 
level (2% and 3% of total local budget, respectively). 
Further, we find that low commuting costs enhance the NIMBY behavior of small jurisdictions. 
Positive commuting costs have a similar effect as the payroll tax. They limit or stop wage 
leakage through commuting but the leakage of pollution rents persists. This result adds to the 
discussion about the goods and the ills of subsidizing commuting. In many countries, 
commuters may not pay their full costs since transport is subsidized in many ways. Moreover, 
countries like Germany, France and Belgium, allow taxpayers to deduct commuting expenses 
from their income tax liability (Borck and Wrede, 2005). 
Finally, we find that bigger jurisdictions are less prone to race-to-the-top competition. They can 
keep higher shares of the benefits, wages and pollution rents within their borders. One may 
solve the inefficiencies by fusing jurisdictions or transferring the environmental competencies to 
the metropolitan government. Apart from the institutional complications, it is very unlikely that 
this measure would solve the existence of geographically well-defined NIMBY groups within the 
metropolitan area. 
The interesting results of this paper open the scope for future research. Empirical evidence is 
needed to show whether intensive commuting corresponds to a race-to-the-top in environmental 
quality, or, whether jurisdictions with a high share of commuters in their labor force have a 
different reaction function to the environmental policy of other jurisdictions. Moreover, it is an 
interesting task to reconcile the race-to-the-top of this paper with the race-to-the-bottom of the 
traditional business tax models. An obvious approach is to model explicitly the market for mobile 
                                                    
18 To make our main point clear, this paper does not include the capture of the market for fixed or mobile industrial 
property/capital. 
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capital in a two-level government framework, e.g. a metropolitan area with sub-metropolitan 
jurisdictions. The sub-metropolitan jurisdictions take into account the effect of commuting as in 
this paper. The government of the metropolitan area, however, considers commuting as an 
intra-metropolitan affair and behaves like the jurisdictions in the tax business models. 
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